The Great Depression in the US is probably the best-known example where bank failures combined with an inadequate response by the monetary authorities resulted in a prolonged economic crises. What causes instability of the financial sector? The balance sheet of banks makes them vulnerable. Banks provide long-term loans, which are at least partly funded through deposits, which are generally withdrawable on demand. Lack of trust may cause depositors to withdraw their money. Apart from this traditional run on a bank, a liquidity crisis can also occur due to illiquidity in money or capital markets. Doubt about the solvency of a bank may lead to a shift in portfolios away from bank liabilities in favor of government securities or corporate assets. A massive withdrawal of deposits or a shift in portfolios could force a bank to liquidate its loan portfolio on unfavorable terms. So, a process that starts as a liquidity crisis could lead to a solvency crisis. Furthermore, problems at one bank could easily spread towards the rest of the financial system. If various banks would go bankrupt, the resulting decline in the money supply could lead to a serious recession. Deposit insurance and liquidity support by the central bank may prevent such a scenario from happening. However, the lender of last resort function of the central bank comes at the price of increased moral hazard. A bank may provide more risky loans in the knowledge that deposit holders are insured and the central bank may come to the rescue. A further problem of deposit insurance arises C Co ou un nt tr ry y C CB B r re es sp po on ns si ib bl le e f fo or r S Su up pe er rv vi is so or r f fi in na an nc ci ia al l s st ta ab bi il li it ty y? ? (2000) of Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) 5 Prof. Dr. Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger. banking l due to adverse selection. The people who are most likely to produce the adverse outcome insured against (bank failure) are those who most want to take advantage of the insurance. Therefore, regulation and supervision are needed. Banking regulation generally consists of restrictions on bank assets holdings and capital requirements. In some countries banking supervision is carried out by the central bank. In other countries this task is performed by another institution(s), sometimes in close cooperation with the central bank (see Table 1 ). Following the recent adoption by the UK 1 and Luxembourg of the separation approach, only six EU member countries have the central bank as the only authority responsible for banking supervision. According to Lannoo (1999) the development that central banks retreat from supervisory functions can be explained as follows. First, banking is becoming an increasingly complex business and less clearly defined. Leading banks are active in several jurisdictions as providers of a whole series of financial services. Linked to this are new developments in financial supervision, which increasingly emphasize the role of self-regulation and internal risk management in financial institutions. Finally, there is increasing acceptance that the government, not the central bank, should take responsibility for ultimate financial support. This was demonstrated earlier this decade in Norway and Sweden, but also more recently in France. In those cases there was no alternative but to rely on taxpayer funding, leading to more demand for political control of supervisory functions. The ECB is not entrusted with any direct responsibility related to prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. 2 These functions are in the realm of the competent national authorities. In most EU countries the central bank plays a role here, albeit that the supervision is often entrusted to another agency (see Table 1 ). Limiting the ECB functions to monetary policy is part of a general trend of withdrawal from supervisory functions in central banking and fits with the home country control principles of the single market. Specific expertise in and knowledge of prudential control is situated at the local level, where the bulk of the operations of financial institutions are still located (Lannoo, 1999) . There is no agreement on the role of the central banks in supervision (see PadoaSchioppa, 2003) . The ECB (2001) has argued in favor of the role of National Central Banks (NCBs) in supervision. In this way systemic threats to stability within the euro area can be better met. Another possibility is to have a network of single supervisory agencies that undertake supervision. As can be seen in the Table 2 , all central banks, except the ECB, are involved in financial stability and the majority of NCBs is involved in financial supervision.
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Trade-Off between Central Bank Involvement and Supervision Unification
Masciandaro (2004) there is at least one sector with two authorities assigned to supervise and one of these authorities is also responsible for at least one other sector. 1 is subtracted if in the country there is at least one sector with two authorities assigned to supervise, but neither of these authorities has responsibility for another sector.
banking l central bank involvement than the current EU member states. Differences in the field of financial supervision unification seem to be higher than differences in the degree of central bank involvement. By using these two indices it is possible to identify each national institutional structure. By combining low and high values for the FAC and CFBA index four supervisory models can be present. Masciandaro (2004a) Masciandaro gives two explanations for this trade-off. The blurring hazard effect is the fear that the function as lender of last resort of the central bank might be spread to other institutions if the central bank supervises the insurance and securities trading firms. The monopolistic bureau effect is the idea that policymakers are feared that an overly powerful bureaucratic agency is created in a country in which the central bank involvement in supervision is high and therefore want more supervisory agencies. The trade-off between the involvement of the central bank and the unification power is supported by econometric analyses of Masciandaro and Porta (2004) and Masciandaro (2004b) . Masciandaro (2004b) states that it is not possible to define the optimal degree of financial supervision a priori. Policymakers who decide whether to maintain or reform the supervisory regime calculate the expected optimal degree of financial supervision. The dependent variable in the analysis of Masciandaro is the supervisory regime with one or more authorities. The political delegation process and the dynamics of other structural economic and institutional variables are expected to influence the dependent variable. The Financial Authorities Unification index (FAU index) is a measure of the degree of unification of financial supervision powers. This index is exactly the same indicator as the FAC index in Masciandaro (2004a) . Masciandaro (2004b) has tested econometrically with probit and logit models the trade-off between the degree of supervision unification and the degree of central bank involvement in supervision controlling for a number of governance and legal factors. The specification below, Eq.
(1), represents his best outcome of all specifications tested by him. banking l therefore it represents the control variables for the law and finance view. 6 Latitude is a control variable for the institutional factor and represents the control variable for the endowment view. 7 Masciandaro (2004b) finds that when the involvement of the central bank in supervision increases, the likelihood of greater unification in supervision, and therefore the probability of having one single financial authority, decreases. This result holds for various model specifications and country samples. Masciandaro states that it is more likely that there is a Single Authority model if the financial system is smaller, the private governance model is more equity dominated, and the public governance goodness is higher. In addition a relationship between the concentration of powers and the institutional framework seems to exist. There is a positive relationship between the degree of supervision unification and the German and Scandinavian rule of law. In Masciandaro and Porta (2003) The definitions of the variables FAU, CBFA and MvBdum are the same as in the analysis of Masciandaro (2004b) . In the above equation FD index is a dummy that measures the development of the financial system of a country. 8 The Bank Concentration index is an indicator of the degree of banking concentration in a given country and the last variable added, Government Market Aversion, in the above equation measures the aversion of a government to market policies. The results of Masciandaro and Porta (2004) , based on a sample of 68 countries, show that the probability of getting a single financial authority will be higher in case of lower central bank involvement, a better developed financial system, a more marketoriented intermediation model, a more concentrated intermediation system and a government that supports market policies.
In modifying the concentration of powers within a country the previous variables should be taken into account. When Masciandaro and Porta take a look at the 27 countries of the (future) enlarged EU the results indicate that if the CBFA dummy is excluded, which was still negative and significant, all other variables are not significant anymore (although they still have the same sign). This result can be explained by looking at the ten EU accession countries. Of these countries four have only one financial authority, five have minimal involvement of the central bank in both financial regulation and supervision. 
Integration of European Financial Markets
De Boissieu (2002) argues that a lot of convergence has occurred within the European banking sector but there are some factors hindering the achievement of a single market. Examples are the divergences in the structure of financing, gaps between countries in the field in legislations that are too large, differences in the attitude of public decision makers and in the behavior of private investors. Further integration is expected to occur in the form of more banking consolidations, crossborder mergers or acquisitions, increased banking concentration and increased conglomeration. Therefore, the amount of externalities will increase. Schoenmaker (2004) first takes a look at the amount of integration of the European financial markets. Integration of financial markets is pursued because it is expected to lead to economic growth and employment creation because of increased efficiency. An indicator for financial integration that is often used, are cross border mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions. Walter (2003) gives an overview of the value of mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector between 1986 and 2000. It is clear from his study that most of the financial restructuring in Europe was on an in-sector and domestic basis, namely 76 per cent. Only 29 per cent of the total amount of mergers and acquisitions in Europe were cross-border intra-European. Relatively most crossborder intra-European mergers were within the insurance sector and the banking sector had relatively the least cross-border intraEuropean mergers. The question is whether a European supervisor is needed before there are a lot of pan-European mergers occurring. Schoenmaker (2004) argues that although there are some differences between markets, the wholesale markets within the European financial system are integrated. In contrast, retail markets are not integrated at all. The convergence of consumer lending rates is small and this result suggests limited integration in retail markets. Reasons are both differences in language, cultural, consumer protection rules and taxation. The introduction of the Euro and the planned removal of legal and regulatory obstacles (Financial Services Action Plan of the European Commission) will probably increase the integration in the retail markets. Schoenmaker argues that when cross-border financial activity increases, it will become more difficult to supervise the financial system at a national level.
Restructuring Financial Supervision in Europe: More Centralization and Cross-Sector Integration
In the EU prudential supervision is based on home country control, which means that a financial institution is authorized and supervised in its home country. Home country control is combined with minimum standards and mutual recognition. When a financial institution becomes pan-European no additional supervision is needed. It is argued by proponents of home country control that the effectiveness of supervision is higher when the home country makes a group wide-assessment of the risk profile and the capital adequacy of a financial institution. In addition, efficiency of supervision is increased because financial institutions do not have different supervisors. This prevents duplication of effects and regulatory costs. Home country supervision authorities are only responsible for financial stability in the home country and not in the host countries. In case of a failure, home country taxpayers do not want to pay for the cross-border spillover effects that this failure has. Cross-border spillover effects or externalities will increase with the increased integration within the EU. As noted by Schoenmaker (2004) Table 5 an overview is given of the main models. Separate supervisors exist for banking, insurance and securities in the sectoral model. In the functional cross-sector model, 'twin peak', separate supervisors are present for prudential supervision and the conduct of business (two objectives of supervision). In the integrated cross-sector model there is one supervisor that combines supervision of banking, insurance, securities and prudential and conduct of business supervision. Decentralized and with co-operation means that there is decision-making by consensus. Instead, if there is co-ordination, decisions are made by autonomous national decisionmakers based on a rule (e.g. majority voting). In case of centralization, decision making on supervisory regulation and policy is done at a European level. European countries differ in the way they have organized financial supervision. All basic organizational structure models can be observed somewhere. The supervision structure has changed in a lot of countries.
As can be seen in Table 6 the trend is towards cross-sector supervision. The underlying reason for this is the increased amount of financial conglomerates, which makes the division between financial sectors more vague. Both the cross-sector functional and integrated model have become increasingly popular. There are other arguments both for and against a separation of the responsibilities for monetary policy and supervision (see Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996) . The first argument in favor is the possibility of a conflict of interests between both activities. A central bank, responsible for supervision of the financial system and, thus, also for failures of financial institutions, could be tempted to admit lower (money market) interest rates or higher money growth than would be desirable from the perspective of price stability, in order to avoid such failures. banking l central bank has a function as lender of last resort for the financial system and has in that capacity the task to supply instantly enough liquidity in the case of liquidity problems or rescue operations. Because of its function of lender of last resort, the central bank must always be informed by the financial supervisor(s) about (potential) crises in the banking system. Various critics have argued that the situation where the ECB puts its resources at stake while national supervisors remain responsible for supervision, creates a huge potential for inter-agency conflicts (Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 1992) . National supervisors may have interests of their own, like keeping national banks in business. Lacking expertise and the time to acquire any, the ECB is likely to follow the advice of the national supervisor if a crisis occurs. Led astray by possibly biased advice and information, the ECB may then create excess liquidity, thereby perhaps even compromising on its primary objective of price stability (Arnold, 1999) . This reasoning assumes that the ECB will act as lender of last resort. Surprisingly enough, no explicit reference is made in the Maastricht Treaty to the role of the ECB as a lender of last resort. However, the ECB has a responsibility for promoting the smooth operation of payment systems, including the provision of financing facilities to credit institutions. In this respect there is a potential for the ECB to act in the capacity as a lender of last resort as far as the provision of short-term liquidity is concerned (OECD, 1998) . Furthermore, the trend towards greater financial integration will make it increasingly difficult to establish national dividing lines. Even when a bank problem can be identified as a national one, it may quickly become European in scope, warranting action by the central bank. Indeed, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) find that in most banking problems in the history of industrial countries central banks have been involved. However, in crisis management the creation of central bank money is just one category of emergency action. The central bank may not be the provider of liquidity assistance. Funds may also come from the private sector (i.e. other financial institutions) or from the government (i.e. the taxpayers). In the latter case the European Commission will be involved in scrutinizing and authorizing such actions, since state aid must be compatible with the EU's competition legislation. According to Padoa-Schioppa (1999) the textbook case for emergency liquidity assistance to individual institutions has been a rare event over the past decades. Furthermore, the emergence of the single euro money market lowers bank's liquidity risk, because the number of possible sources of funds is now considerably larger than in the past. If a liquidity crisis would occur, the Eurosystem has -at least according to Padoa-Schioppa -the necessary capacity to act. The lender of last resort function of the ECB requires that it will have some monitoring powers as well. This is possible without amending the Maastricht Treaty. The case for an European Financial Services Authority (EFSA) is based on the underlying tendency toward the integration of intermediary and market operations and the relief arising from the existence of an independent agency with a well-defined mission with no conflict between monetary policy and banking supervision (see Vives, 2000 and Eijffinger, 2001) . Such an EFSA would increase the democratic accountability and transparency of banking supervision in Europe. Nevertheless, it would imply a change in the Maastricht Treaty. Experiences with the Financial Services Authority in the UK and other countries (e.g. Sweden) may serve as a laboratory in supervision.
The European Central Bank and Financial Supervision
As a consequence of integration of payment systems and the inter-bank market within the EMU, systemic risk increased. A close link between the European system of financial supervision and the ECB is needed in order to ensure financial stability. The ECB has an operational and regulatory role in the payment system. Payments systems should be safe and efficient in order to get an effective and stable functioning financial system. Schoenmaker (2004) states that the euro system considers that there should be close co-operation between the supervisors of banks and the supervisors of the payment system. It would lead to less financial system risk and therefore increased stability. In the Maastricht Treaty there is a separation between the task of monetary policy and the task financial supervision and stability, although there is a relationship between oversight on the payment system and some broader functions why financial supervision and stability are necessary. According to Schoenmaker one could give the ECB a financial supervision task, if it is thought to be desirable. A treaty basis is needed if one wants to create a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). Provisions that are linked to the ECB could be amended. The independence of the monetary function should be kept and a cross-sector supervisor function with political accountability could be defined. The Lamfalussy approach stimulates the convergence of supervisory practices. Differences in supervision that remain will occur because of differences in financial structures between countries. After convergence has taken place there will be more similar policy (supervisory standards based on best practices) and this gives the EU a more level playing field (EFC, 2002) . The system of financial supervision will become more efficient. In addition, centralization will be more desirable because the costs in terms of lost flexibility will be lower. Centralization at an European level may be desirable if the number of cross-border externalities increases. Schoenmaker mentions the ESFS, which could co-operate with the national supervisors. This does not mean that all supervision has to be done at a centralized level. Home countries can still sep. 04 banking l have the task of small and medium-sized financial institutions supervision. In many cases field inspections are performed and this is best done at the local level. Instead the supervision of large pan-European financial institutions could be centralized. The policy framework (the reporting requirements, the rule book, the reporting format and computer systems) could be made uniform as well. In order to make local supervisors adhere to this framework one could design the appropriate decisionmaking and incentive mechanism. In addition, pooling of information could be helpful in decreasing systemic risk. Schoenmaker argues that the fiscal costs of possible bail-outs should still be at a national level, because there is no European budget available. He concludes that supervision of financial institutions will become a combination of national and European characteristics. De is in favor of making the implementation of the lender of last resort function clearer. He pleads for subsidiarity as the main basic principle of banking supervision within the European Union. He distinguishes three forms of supervision systems, namely the central bank model, the dual model and the FSA model. In the first supervision structure, banking supervision is in the hands of CB or committee/commission that is highly dependent on the CB. In the dual model, the Ministry of finance or a commission that is attached to it or an independent committee takes care of the banking supervision. The central bank gives technical assistance. In this dual model a high degree of cooperation between the supervisors is present. The last model is the FSA model. In this model an independent organization monitors all banking and financial activities. He states that although the last model gets more attention, institutional convergence within the European Union is only small. It is argued that subsidiarity should be kept as a rule because local/national authorities keep their comparative information advantage. They are still better in gathering local information and monitoring domestic banks. They are better able to implement pillar one and two of Basel II. De Boissieu argues that for several reasons more coordination in the field of banking supervision and financial stability is needed. First of all, the increased number of financial conglomerates, the integration of capital markets and the increase in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the banking and insurance sector lead to more spill-over effects. Although coordination in banking supervision has increased, it has not increased enough. Multilateral supervision cooperation occurs mostly in the field of macro-prudential supervision and coordination of micro-prudential supervision occurs mainly in a bilateral manner. De Boissieu says that fully decoupling of prudential policy from monetary policy is not possible. He states that the optimal amount of centralization and coordination can differ between supervision of financial institutions and lender of last resort interventions. In the first case local information is important. In case of the lender of last resort more centralization is important because during systemic crises externalities are increasing a lot. In addition quick intervention is needed and local information is less decisive for these operations. Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) argue that banking supervision should be done by an agency that is separated from the central bank. They state that functional separation is desirable. OECD countries are divided in countries where the central bank is a monopolist in banking supervision and countries in which this is not the case. The latter countries have lower inflation rates and less volatile inflation rates. Banks supervised by the central bank are more profitable but face larger staff costs and issue less bonds. This could indicate lower efficiency. Although the data that was used by them was not definitively in favor of a separation of the supervision agency and the central bank some reasons are mentioned why separation should occur. The reasons mentioned are: the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems, cost accountability. Separation could make it more transparent who is paying for monetary policy and who is for banking supervision. Di Noia and Di Giorgio favour also an independent ESFS structure. This supervision structure should be similar to the structure of the ESCB. This means that national agencies in EU member countries should participate actively. They want two European financial regulation agencies, which are formally separated from the ECB. The first agency would be responsible for the stability of all intermediaries and the second agency is responsible for transparency and disclosure requirements. They believe that comprehensive coordination of legislation and execution of regulation in financial markets could be achieved in this way. They propose to place both agencies at the center of the ESFS. Walter (2001) , however, argues in favor of a single European regulator, an EFSA. He thinks that it is unavoidable if one wants an integrated single financial market within Europe. He states that financial markets are integrated enough to have one regulator. The single European agency should not be bureaucratic and supervise every institution. He supports the idea of a federal structure, like the European System of Central Banks (ECB and NCBs). The EFSA should be in the center of the European System of Financial Regulators. Tasks of the EFSA would include harmonization and co-ordination of financial regulation and the design of common principles and guidelines. In addition the EFSA should check whether the rules are implemented consistently across all European countries. Another task of the EFSA could be the monitoring of large pan-European banking groups. Walter wants a separation between the EFSA and the ECB because they have conflicting interests, clearly defined mandates are needed and basic democratic principles have to be satisfied. He argues that cooperation between the EFSA and the ECB and national central banks is desirable and states that the model used in Germany is a good role model for Europe.
sep. 04 banking l Vives (2001) analyzes the restructuring of financial regulation in the EMU. He states that a financial supervision system in which NCBs are responsible for financial stability could lead to some problems. First of all, there will be a conflict in interest when a transnational crisis occurs. National supervisors will only take into account the effects of a crisis on the financial stability in their own country and neglect the adverse effects the crisis could have on other countries. Secondly, national authorities could execute too much intervention because they will listen more to domestic interest groups that see some institutions as too big too fail. Too much intervention will take place as well if the costs of intervention are distributed over the whole EU. This happens in case of concern of general financial stability within the EU. Thirdly, there are some regulatory jurisdiction problems. The question is who wants to bail out financial institutions that are located in more than one European country because not all the benefits of a bailout go to one country. The fourth problem mentioned by him is the fact that a national supervisor is not able to provide sufficient help in case of a crisis, because of contagion to other countries that can take place. The last problem is a fiscal issue. It is not clear how high the rescue amount has too be and how the payment and losses have to be divided across countries. Some arguments can be put forward to give the central bank supervision tasks. The central bank can distinguish whether a problem is a problem of liquidity or of solvency and this minimizes the losses that occur wit loans granted. The central bank could be a crises manager and determine what the best kind of intervention is. In addition it can have economies of scope in information gathering by combining the tasks of providing liquidity and supervision. More banking supervisory information within the ECB could improve the accuracy of the macroeconomic forecasts. Vives argues that the only institution that can guarantee stability is the ECB. Coordination in case of crisis situations is not enough. Instead quick centralized interventions should be taken. In addition he suggests that the ECB should publish the formal framework of crisis resolution. It should be made transparent in which cases the NCBs need to intervene and in which cases this task is for the ECB. He points out that the ECB should perform some monitoring tasks as well. It should get the power to access and gather supervisory information. As a consequence costs in communication and negation will decrease and the exchange of information could be facilitated. Amendment of the Maastricht Treaty is not needed to achieve this. It is important to have a procedure that describes how losses in case of lender of last resort activities are divided between countries. The Ecofin could be consulted when such operations are needed. The costs of bargaining ex post are reduced when the crisis procedures are clear and in case of a crisis situation fast intervention is possible. Vives states that cooperation is not enough in case of an integrated European market. A centralized supervisor is needed and could lead to even further integration of European markets. The establishment of an independent EFSA that has authority over banking, insurance and securities would have some advantages. Firstly, it might better resist the local pressure to assist particular institutions. Furthermore, accountability would be facilitated because the ECB and the ESFA have clear missions. This prevents the conflict monetary policy and supervision. In addition, it would prevent an increase in the power of the ECB and would let the ECB remain its credibility in monetary policy. Vives argued in 2001 that an ESFA was not desirable yet because there was not enough political integration within Europe. The ESFA would therefore face the same accountability problems that the ECB faces because a well-defined political principle is missing.
Conclusion: Towards a European Financial Services Authority
Based on the previous analysis, I personally think that in the long run the best system for European financial supervision will be a European Financial Services Authority (see also Eijffinger, 2001 ). There will be a tendency to more integrated supervision because of the long-run trend to financial conglomerates in Europe. Next to that there will also be a development towards more cross-border supervision depending on the pace of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The cross-border externalities between EU financial institutions and markets will become increasingly important. This means that there will be in the long run a federally organized financial supervision structure with the EFSA at the centre in which national supervisors (NCBs and national FSAs) still have supervision tasks. Like the ESCB, it will have all the characteristics of a 'hub and spokes' system. Of course, quite crucial will be the decision about the degree of centralization of financial supervision. When the degree of centralization is high, we could speak of a "strong" EFSA. Instead, when the degree of centralization is low, the EFSA is said to be "weak". In both systems the ECB has an important role to play because of its responsibility for financial stability in general and its function of lender of last resort in particular. The difference between the "weak" and "strong" EFSA will also determine the relative influence of the ECB, which will be higher in case of a "strong" EFSA (high degree of centralization). Financial supervisors and academics see these tendencies very well, but it is up to the political authorities to take timely steps in this direction. It would be good news if the EU political authorities (Ecofin, European Commission and European Parliament) would open a serious debate on whether and how European financial supervision should be concentrated with a newly established EFSA and what the future role of the ECB should be in this respect. I fear, however, that we need a major European financial crisis (e.g. a serious bank failure in France, Germany or Italy) before the political authorities will become aware of this jump to a European level of financial supervision. There are economies of scale in supervision, as well as some practical advantages. There is a one-stopshopping for conglomerate financial groups. Expertise is pooled and co-operation between the different functional supervisors is guaranteed. Still, the differences in risk profiles and in the nature of the businesses remain an important argument against a mega-supervisor, most importantly for banking as compared to the insurance business (Lannoo, 1999) .
2 The Maastricht Treaty establishes however a simplified procedure that makes it possible without amending the Treaty, to entrust specific supervisory tasks to the ECB. 
